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When investment is irreversible, theory suggests that firms will be “reluctant to invest.” This 
reluctance creates a wedge between the discount rate guiding investment decisions and the 
standard Jorgensonian user cost (adjusted for risk). We use the intertemporal tradeoff between 
the benefits and costs of changing the capital stock to estimate this wedge, which we label the 
irreversibility premium. Estimates are based on panel data for the period 1980-2001. The 
large dataset allows us to estimate the effects of limited resale markets, low depreciation rates, 
high uncertainty, and negative industry-wide shocks on the irreversibility premium. Our 
estimates provide a readily interpretable measure of the importance of irreversibility and 
document that the irreversibility premium is both economically and statistically significant. 
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1.   Introduction  
  How important is investment irreversibility?  When capital goods are highly specialized 
or industry specific, firms may find that reversing an investment decision is impossible or, more 
generally, costly because of a differential between the purchase price and resale price of the 
capital good or because of fixed costs from disinvesting.  Much theoretical work has examined 
the impact of completely or partly irreversible investment on firm behavior.  (Among other 
studies, see Bernanke (1983), Abel and Eberly (1994), Bertola and Caballero (1994), and Dixit 
and Pindyck (1994), as well as the earlier work of Arrow (1968) and Nickell (1978) and the 
survey by Caballero (1999).)  The fundamental result is that irreversibility generates a 
“reluctance to invest,” as a forward-looking firm hesitates to invest today because of the 
possibility that it may wish to sell capital in the uncertain future but will be able to reclaim little 
if any of the undepreciated value. 
  The impact of irreversibility – or, more generally, non-convex adjustment costs – has 
been assessed in several empirical studies discussed below.
1  This paper takes a new approach to 
assessing the impact of irreversibility by focusing on the intertemporal pattern of investment.  
The “reluctance to invest” result can be characterized by a wedge between the discount rate that 
guides investment decisions and the Jorgensonian user cost of capital (adjusted for risk).  
Irreversibility constraints force the firm to use a discount rate higher than the risk-adjusted 
market discount rate.  This wedge between effective and market discount rates is the 
“irreversibility premium.”  As part of the discount rate, it affects the intertemporal tradeoff 
between the costs and benefits of adjusting the capital stock.  We use the intertemporal tradeoff 
to estimate the irreversibility premium.  Our approach focuses on the fundamental theoretical 
implication of irreversibility and provides a readily interpretable measure of the economic 
importance of irreversibility constraints.     
  We derive the irreversibility premium and our empirical specification from the optimality 
conditions for investment.  Our analysis is based on the investment model of Abel and Eberly 
(1994), which encompasses a variety of frictions that have been prominent in the investment 
                                           
1 Throughout the paper, we use “irreversible” to refer to either complete or partial irreversibility that 
results in unrecoverable sunk costs.  The theoretical model and estimating equation allow for the more 
general case of partial irreversibility (which includes complete irreversibility as a special case when the 
resale value of capital is zero), as well as fixed costs.  
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literature – irreversibility (or, more precisely, costly reversibility), convex adjustment costs, and 
fixed costs.  We extract the testable implications associated with the Abel-Eberly model for the 
discount rate that appears in the Euler equation for capital.   
  We begin by showing how the convex adjustment cost model is nested within the non-
convex adjustment cost model as a special case where the purchase and resale prices of capital 
goods are equal and there are no fixed costs of adjusting the capital stock.  We derive the Euler 
equation for the convex adjustment cost model and show how terms involving the price of 
capital goods, marginal adjustment costs, the irreversibility premium, and an indicator variable 
for a high probability of facing a binding irreversibility constrain will all enter the error term of 
the Euler equation for the convex adjustment cost model if there are non-convex adjustment 
costs in the data.  This yields a series of three tests between the convex and non-convex 
adjustment cost models, based on the overidentifying restrictions for the convex and non-convex 
adjustment cost models.  First, for the full sample, the data reject the convex adjustment cost 
model.  Second, for a subsample of observations where non-convex adjustment costs are unlikely 
to be important, the test of overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the convex adjustment cost 
model.  Third, the test of overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the non-convex adjustment 
cost model (for the full sample).  These three results provide evidence for the importance of non-
convex adjustment costs. 
  We then move to our main contribution, which is to estimate the irreversibility premium.  
We estimate the Euler equation for capital and allow the intertemporal pattern of investment 
spending to reveal what discount rate firms are using.  We calculate the irreversibility premium 
by estimating the difference in risk-adjusted discount rates between observations where firms are 
more likely to face binding irreversibility constraints and the rest of the observations in our 
dataset.   
  Economic theory suggests a number of factors that should determine the importance of 
irreversibility: limited resale markets, low depreciation, high uncertainty, and negative industry-
wide shocks.  Irreversibility arises when it is costly for firms to dispose of used capital.  The 
estimated irreversibility premium for firms with limited resale markets is 510 basis points, using 
an approach to measuring limited resale markets based on Shleifer and Vishny's (1992) analysis 
of liquidation values.  Low depreciation rates make it more difficult for firms to shed unwanted 
capital and therefore more likely that they will bump up against the irreversibility constraint.   
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The estimated irreversibility premium for firms with low depreciation rates is 220 basis points.  
Previous theoretical work suggests that the irreversibility premium is increasing in the degree of 
uncertainty.  The estimated irreversibility premium for firms with a high degree of uncertainty 
(about demand for their products) is 730 basis points.  Unfavorable shocks tend to push firms 
towards the irreversibility constraint, and it may be more difficult for firms to dispose of capital 
goods when a negative shock affects the industry as a whole.  The estimated irreversibility 
premium for observations when there has been a recent negative industry-wide shock is 550 
basis points.  For each of these characteristics, the estimated irreversibility premium is 
significantly different from zero. 
  Even though it faces, for example, limited resale markets, a firm might be unlikely to 
encounter a binding irreversibility constraint if its industry is doing well or it has a high 
depreciation rate.  We therefore examine the interaction between characteristics that affect the 
probability and cost of irreversibility. When a firm has a low depreciation rate and high cost 
uncertainty, the estimated irreversibility premium is 920 basis points. The estimated 
irreversibility premium for firms with limited resale markets and high demand uncertainty is 
1080 basis points.  For firms with a low depreciation rate that have suffered recent negative 
industry-wide shocks, the estimated irreversibility premium is 1260 basis points.   
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 contains a review of several empirical 
approaches to assessing the impact of irreversibility and some previous papers that have 
estimated investment Euler equations.  Section 3 derives the irreversibility premium and our 
empirical specification from the conditions for optimal behavior and relates the irreversibility 
premium to the probability and cost of facing binding irreversibility constraints.  Section 4 
briefly describes auxiliary assumptions required for estimation (e.g., rational expectations), and 
discusses our panel dataset, which covers the period 1980-2001.  Section 5 derives the convex 
adjustment cost model as a special case of the model in Section 3 and presents tests of the 
convex and non-convex adjustment cost models.  Section 6 reports estimates of the irreversibility 
premium.  Section 7 examines whether non-convex adjustment costs, finance constraints, or both 
affect the discount rate.  Section 8 tests whether the non-convex adjustment cost  model provides 
a good fit to the data in the three investment regimes in the model – positive investment, zero 
investment, and negative investment.  Section 9 offers a brief conclusion and discusses some 
implications of our findings.  
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2.   Prior empirical studies 
  The impact of irreversibility has been examined in several studies using a variety of 
approaches.  One set of studies focuses on the current level of investment expenditures.  
Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1995, U.S. plant data) and Goolsbee and Gross (1997, 
airplane data) show that the adjustment rate of investment is asymmetric, being much larger for 
expanding than contracting plants or airlines.  These results are consistent with irreversibility 
constraints and at odds with the familiar convex adjustment cost model.  Abel and Eberly 
(1996a, U.S. firm data), Eberly (1997, firm data for 11 industrialized countries), Caballero and 
Engel (1999, U.S. two-digit industry data), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006, U.S. plant data), and 
Bloom (2007, U.S. firm data) find that the addition of non-convex adjustment costs to a model 
with convex adjustment costs significantly improves the fit.  A negative relation between 
investment and uncertainty is consistent with the presence of important irreversibility effects and 
has been reported by Leahy and Whited (1996, U.S. firm data) and Ghosal and Loungani (2000, 
U.S. industry data).  Guiso and Parigi (1999, Italian firm data) also find that investment is 
negatively related to uncertainty and that this effect is greater for firms that cannot easily reverse 
their investment decisions because of limited resale markets for capital goods.
2  Bloom, Bond, 
and van Reenen (2007, UK firm data) examine the effect of non-convex adjustment costs on the 
responsiveness of investment.  They find that higher uncertainty reduces the responsiveness of 
investment to demand shocks -- and that these "cautionary effects" are large.  Barnett and 
Sakellaris (1998, U.S. firm data) examine the sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s Q over 
different regimes defined by Q.  They document differential sensitivity across three regimes but, 
in contrast to the irreversibility model of Abel and Eberly (1994), do not find that the sensitivity 
is lower in the regime where Q equals its long-run equilibrium value of unity.  Abel and Eberly 
(1996a) show that this result could be consistent with their model when it includes 
heterogeneous capital goods.   
  The importance of irreversibility has been assessed in several other studies that do not  
                                           
2 The negative relation between uncertainty and investment has been reported for other countries:  
Belgium, Butzen, Fuss, and Vermeulen (2003); Germany, von Kalckreuth (2003); the 
 Netherlands, Bo, 
Lensink, and Sterken (2001); United Kingdom, Temple, Urga, and Driver (2001).  
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focus on investment expenditures.
3  Pindyck and Soliamanos (1993, aggregate data for 30 
countries) and Caballero and Pindyck (1996, U.S. industry data) estimate the relationship 
between proxies for the investment threshold and variables such as the volatility of the marginal 
product of capital, reporting results consistent with irreversibility. Studying capital allocation in 
the depressed U.S. aerospace industry, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) find that, on average, the 
market value of used assets is only 30% of the estimated replacement cost of new equipment 
(adjusted for depreciation).  Asplund (2000) reports a comparable statistic of 50% based on 
salvage values of metalworking machinery in Sweden.  
  In addition to studies that examine the importance of irreversibility, another strand of the 
literature that is relevant to our paper is prior empirical estimates of investment Euler equations.  
Shapiro (1986) and Whited (1992) were pioneering studies.  Shapiro (1986) was one of the first 
to estimate the first-order condition for investment (Euler equation), rather than a closed-form 
decision rule, such as a Q investment equation.  Whited (1992) showed how investment Euler 
equations could be used to test for finance constraints.  Her paper is part of a substantial 
literature that includes Hubbard and Kashyap (1992), Bond and Meghir (1994), Hubbard, 
Kashyap, and Whited (1995), Ng and Schaller (1996), Whited (1998), Love (2003), Chirinko 
and Schaller (2004a), and Whited and Wu (2006).  Whited (1998) is particularly relevant, 
because it uses the investment Euler equation to examine whether the standard convex 
adjustment cost model fits the data and finds evidence against the model.  We return to this point 
in Section 5, where we use a similar approach (based on overidentifying restrictions) to test the 
convex adjustment cost model and find evidence consistent with Whited (1998). 
 
3.  Optimal investment  
  This section derives the irreversibility premium and our empirical specification from the 
optimality conditions for the firm’s investment problem.  We use the Abel and Eberly (1994) 
model as a point of departure.  The Abel-Eberly model encompasses a variety of frictions, 
                                           
3 The relation between the capital stock and irreversibility is ambiguous.  When there are irreversibility 
constraint, a firm faces a “user cost effect” (i.e., a positive irreversibility premium) that has a negative 
impact on the desired capital stock.  But it also faces a “hangover effect” reflecting that firms will 
occasionally have more capital than is desired and the irreversibility constraint will prevent them from 
making the appropriate reduction.  Thus, the observed capital stock can be higher or lower in the face of 
irreversibility constraints (Abel and Eberly (1999); Caballero (1999)).  
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including costly reversibility, convex adjustment costs, and fixed costs of changing the capital 
stock.
4  Equation (16) expresses the intertemporal tradeoff that we use to estimate the 
irreversibility premium.  Readers with less immediate interest in the derivations are encouraged 
to proceed to Section 3.2., which offers an intuitive explanation of the intertemporal tradeoff and 
describes our strategy for identifying the irreversibility premium.  
  Central to the study of non-convex adjustment costs is that the optimal level of 
investment can be positive, zero, or negative.  The positive investment regime has been analyzed 
extensively in the convex adjustment cost literature, and we begin with this familiar model in 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2.  With this benchmark established, we then proceed to develop an 
econometric model appropriate to the non-positive investment regimes in Section 3.3.  
 
3.1.  The intertemporal tradeoff 
  The risk-neutral firm selects policies to maximize its expected present value of profits in 
the face of four constraints.  First, output is determined by a technology depending on capital 
(K), a vector of variable factors of production, and a stochastic technology shock (ε, which can 
also represent stochastic shocks to the demand schedule or to prices of the variable factors). Second, 
ε is a diffusion process evolving according to the following equation (time subscripts have been 
suppressed), 
 
  dε  =  μ[ε] dt +  σ[ε]   d z ,           ( 1 )  
 
where μ[ε] is the drift term, σ[ε] is the instantaneous variance, and z is a standard Weiner 
process.  Third, capital depreciates geometrically at rate δ, and evolves according to the 
following equation,  
 
  dK  =  (I - δK )   d t ,            ( 2 )    
 
where I is the investment rate.   
                                           
4 Other models (such as Bertola and Caballero (1994) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) are likely to yield a 
corresponding irreversibility premium.  For example, in equations (10) and (11) in Bertola and Caballero, 
the expression ½ Σ
2A corresponds to the irreversibility premium θ derived below.   
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  Fourth, the firm is constrained by an augmented adjustment cost function, C[I,K], that 
distinguishes between regimes where investment is positive, negative, or zero.  The function 
C[I,K] is differentiable for all I, except at I=0.  (There are two independent sources of non-
differentiability at zero: a difference between purchase and resale prices and fixed costs.)  To 




+ = 1   if I > 0,  0 otherwise,                (3a) 
  v
− = 1   if I < 0,  0 otherwise,                (3b) 
  v
0 = 1   if I = 0,  0 otherwise.                (3c) 
 
Note that the three regimes are mutual exclusive and exhaustive.  To reflect the partly 
irreversible nature of investment, we distinguish between the prices at which the firm can 
purchase (p
+) and resell (p
−) a unit of uninstalled capital, where p
+ >  p
− > 0.  If p
− = 0, 
investment is completely irreversible; if p
+ = p
−, investment is completely reversible.  
Additionally, whenever investing or disinvesting, the firm incurs convex adjustment costs, 
G[I,K].  As is standard in the literature, G[0,K] = GI[0,K] = GK[0,K] = 0.  Lastly, the firm faces 
fixed costs, F, whenever investing or disinvesting.  The augmented adjustment cost function is 
specified as follows, 
 
  C[I,K]  =  v
+ p
+ I  +  v
− p
− I  +  G[I,K]  +  (1- v
0) 
 F .      ( 4 )  
 
  Given these four constraints, value maximizing behavior generates two conditions 
describing the optimal paths for investment and capital that are useful in deriving our 
econometric equation.  When the firm is investing or disinvesting in period t, the marginal value 
of a unit of installed capital in period t (qt) equals the marginal adjustment costs (CI[It,Kt]), 
 








t + GI[It,Kt],                 (5) 
    qt > q
+   ↔  It > 0  ↔  v
+
t  =   1 ,         ( 6 a )  
    qt < q
−   ↔  It < 0  ↔  v
−






− are the threshold values that depend only on the augmented adjustment cost 
technology and Kt is the beginning-of-period capital stock.  As shown by equations (6a) and 
(6b), whether a firm is in a positive or negative investment regime is determined by the value of 
q relative to these two thresholds.  Note that equation (5) does not apply to the zero investment 
regime.  When qt lies between the threshold values, q
− < qt < q
+, the firm is in the “zone of 
inaction,” and optimal investment is zero.  
 For ease of exposition, we will initially focus on 
positive investment in period t, returning to the case of zero and negative investment in period t 
in Section 3.3 below.  
  Value maximizing behavior also generates the following one-period return relation (Abel 
and Eberly, 1994, equation 19) obtained by differentiating the Bellman equation with respect to 
the capital stock, 
 
  (rt+δ) qt  =  πK[It,Kt,εt]  +  E{dqt}  /  dt,        (7) 
 
where rt is the market discount rate (adjusted for systematic risk, inflation, and taxes), E{.} is the 
expectation operator, and πK[It,Kt,εt] is the marginal revenue product of capital.  The latter term 
includes both the increment to production and the decrement to convex adjustment costs 
(GK[It,Kt]), and reflects optimal choices of variable factors and investment.  The left side of 
equation (7) is the required return on a marginal unit of capital, and is equated to capital's 
expected return, the incremental profit plus expected capital gain.  Defining (qt+1 - qt) ≡ dqt and 
πK,t  ≡ πK[It,Kt,εt] and assuming that expectations are formed with information available in period 
t, E{.} ≡ Et{.}, we rewrite equation (7) as follows, 
 
  -qt(1+rt+δ)  +  (πK,t + Et{qt+1})    =    0,         (8) 
 
which has the form of a standard Euler equation appearing frequently in the investment 
literature. 
  In order for equation (8) to be estimable, we need to relate the qt and Et{qt+1} terms to 
observable variables.  Since in this section we are focusing on the positive investment regime in 




  qt  =  p
+
t +  GI[It,Kt] .                       ( 9 )  
 
   The analysis of Et{qt+1} is more complicated.  We begin by taking the expectation of qt+1 
for period t+1 conditional on period t information, and form the following set of conditional 
expectations for the three investment regimes, 
 
  Et{qt+1}  =  h
+








t+1 Et{qt+1 : v
0




t+1 is the probability of being in the positive investment regime in period t+1 and v
+
t+1 is 









t+1).  The first two terms in equation (10) pertain to the positive 
and negative investment regimes, respectively, and contain unobservable qt+1’s.  We eliminate 
these unobservable variables by advancing the terms in equation (5) by one period and 
substituting for the qt+1’s in Et{qt+1 : v
+














t+1  : v
−
t+1}   
                +   h
+
t+1 Et{GI[It+1,Kt+1] : v
+
t+1}  +  h
−
t+1 Et{GI[It+1,Kt+1] : v
−
t+1} 
        +   h
0
t+1 Et{qt+1 : v
0
t+1}.                   (11)   
 













t+1} -- to equation (11) and rearranging, we obtain,  
 



















                +  h
+
t+1 Et{GI[It+1,Kt+1] : v
+
t+1} +  h
−
t+1 Et{GI[It+1,Kt+1] : v
−
t+1}  








t+1}        
                +  h
0




t+1}         ( 1 2 )  
 
The first line in equation (12) is the unconditional expectation of the purchase price of capital, 
Et{p
+
t+1}.  In the zero investment regime, GI[0,Kt+1] = 0 and Et{GI[0,Kt+1] : v
0
t+1} = 0; hence the 
second line in equation (12) represents the unconditional expectation of marginal adjustment  
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costs, Et{GI[It+1,Kt+1]}.  We represent the remaining two terms in equation (12) by ηt, which will 
be discussed in the next subsection, and rewrite equation (12) as follows, 
 
  Et{qt+1}  =  Et{p
+
t+1}  + Et{GI[It+1,Kt+1]}  +  ηt ,               (13) 
 








t+1}  +  h
0




t+1}.        (14)    
 
 Substituting  qt and Et{qt+1} in equation (8) with equations (9) and (13), respectively, we 




t + GI[It,Kt]) (1+rt+δ)  +  (πK,t + Et{p
+
t+1}  + Et{GI[It+1,Kt+1]}  +  ηt) = 0.     (15) 
 
3.2.  Frictions and the irreversibility premium 
  The intertemporal tradeoff described in equation (15) can be interpreted in terms of a 
perturbation argument.  Along the optimal capital accumulation path, the firm is indifferent to an 
increase in capital by 1 unit in period t and a decrease of 1 unit in t+1, thus leaving the capital 
stock unaffected from period t+1 onward.  The cost of this perturbation is represented by  
p
+
t+ GI[It,Kt]) – the marginal purchase cost and marginal convex adjustment costs incurred in 
period t.  In the absence of costly reversibility, perturbing the capital stock creates two benefits, 
πK,t -- the marginal revenue product of capital -- and Et{p
+
t+1 + GI[It+1,Kt+1]} -- the expected 
saving in period t+1.  This saving arises because the period t investment removes the need to 
acquire an additional unit of capital in period t+1 to remain on the optimal accumulation path.  
The Euler equation adjusts for discounting and depreciation (1+rt+δ), and equates benefits and 
costs expressed in temporally comparable terms. 
  Frictions due to costly reversibility and fixed costs impede the firm in equating known 
costs to expected benefits.  These frictions create three regimes in which optimal investment is 
positive, negative, or zero.  The standard Euler equation is based on the assumption that the firm 
will be in the positive investment regime in period t+1.  However, in the face of irreversibility 
constraints, the firm must account for the possibility that, even if it is in the positive investment 
regime in period t, it may find itself in the zero or negative investment regimes in period t+1.    
 
11
  The impacts of these possible deviations from the positive investment regime are 
captured by ηt defined in equation (14). With probability h
−
t+1, the firm will realize a shock so 
that reselling capital is now optimal in t+1 and the period t+1 saving expected in period t 
vanishes.  Anticipating this possibility, the firm "discounts" the saving it expects to receive in 
period t+1.  This discount is the product of the probability of entering the disinvestment regime 
(h
−
t+1) and the cost of being in this regime, the latter measured by the difference between resale 




t+1).  This argument implies that the first term in ηt is negative.  
  The possibility of entering the zero investment regime in period t+1 is analyzed in a 
similar manner. With probability h
0
t+1, the firm will find itself in the zone of inaction in period 
t+1, and the expected saving vanishes.  This loss (p
+
t+1) is partly compensated by the returns 
from the unwanted unit of capital valued at qt+1.  As with the negative investment regime, the 
discount is the product of probability (h
0
t+1) and cost (qt+1 − p
+
t+1).  If there are no fixed costs, 
this cost term and hence the second term in ηt are non-positive.
5  However, fixed costs create 
some ambiguity, as qt+1 now varies both below and above p
+
t+1, and the sign of the second term 
in ηt depends on the distribution of qt+1.
6  Since the second term may nonetheless be negative 
even with fixed costs and h
−
t+1 is much larger than h
0
t+1 in our dataset, the model suggests that ηt 
will be negative.  
   The derived discount wedge ηt reflects the "reluctance to invest" that is a hallmark of the 
irreversibility literature (Caballero, 1999).  In a discrete time model, Bertola and Caballero 
(1994, Section 2) show that the marginal product of capital under irreversibility exceeds the 
Jorgensonian user cost applicable when investment is costlessly reversible.  In the continuous 
time model of Abel and Eberly (1996b, Section V; 1999, Section 2), optimal investment occurs 
only when the marginal revenue product of capital reaches a barrier equal to the Jorgensonian 
user cost plus a term reflecting irreversibility and uncertainty.  Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 
                                           
5 Without fixed costs, qt+1 is never greater than p
+
t+1 in the zero investment regime because the critical 




t+1 and, by the 
definition of the zero investment regime, qt+1 < q
+





 = F = 0.  
6 This positive effect of fixed costs on ηt and the associated investment stimulus is consistent with 
optimizing behavior.  When in period t the firm expects both to be in the zone of inaction in period t+1 
and qt+1 > p
+




t+1} > 0), it has an incentive to increase investment in period t so that 
it has sufficient capital in period t+1 to earn rents (qt+1 - p
+
t+1).  We thank Janice Eberly for noting this 
(initially) counterintuitive result.    
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5) analyze the option to invest today versus tomorrow and show that the marginal product of 
capital triggering the investment outlay is higher under irreversibility and uncertainty.  A similar 
result holds in our model with ηt. 
 To  relate  ηt to the discount rates emphasized in the literature, we normalize the discount 
wedge by the marginal value of an additional unit of capital,  
 
  θt  ≡  −ηt / qt ,             ( 1 6 )  
 




t + GI[It,Kt]) (1+rt+δ+θt)  +  (πK,t + Et{p
+
t+1} + Et{GI[It+1,Kt+1]})  =  0.     (17) 
 
Thus, costly reversibility and fixed costs under uncertainty raise the effective discount rate 
guiding investment decisions from rt to (rt + θt).   This extra term, θt, is the "irreversibility 
premium" estimated in this paper.  
 
3.3.  Non-positive investment in period t 
  The above derivation and discussion was based on the assumption that the firm was in the 
positive investment regime in period t.  This approach, while standard in the convex adjustment 
cost literature, must be modified when studying irreversibility in order to allow for zero 
investment or negative investment in period t.   When the firm is in the zero or negative 
investment regimes in period t, the relationship in equation (9) between qt and the sum of the 
purchase price plus marginal convex adjustment costs will not hold.  Equation (9) is a special 
case of equation (5) that holds only for the positive investment regime.  We use equation (9) as a 
benchmark because the purchase price of new capital is available to the econometrician and 
define ωt as the difference between qt and the purchase price of new capital plus marginal 
convex adjustment costs, 
 
  ωt  ≡  qt – (p
+




With equation (18), we can formulate a more general version of the relationship between 
q and the marginal cost of adding or removing a unit of capital, a version that will hold in each 
of the three investment regimes, by rewriting equation (5) as follows,  
 
  qt  =  CI[It,Kt]  =  p
+
t + GI[It,Kt] + ωt .                   (5’)  
 
In the three regimes, ωt takes on the following values: positive investment, ωt = 0; negative 




t; zero investment, ωt = qt − p
+
t.  In the cases of negative or zero 
investment, ωt contains an unobservable variable (p
−
t or qt, respectively) and, in estimation, will 
be treated as part of the error term, as discussed in Section 4.1.  (We examine the impact of ωt on 
the validity of the estimating equation in Section 8)  Repeating the above substitutions with 
equation (5’) in place of equation (5), we obtain the following more general version of the 




t + GI[It,Kt] + ωt) (1+rt+δ+θt)  +  (πK,t + Et{p
+
t+1} + Et{GI[It+1,Kt+1]}) = 0.      (19) 
 
Thus, the intertemporal tradeoff that holds for negative or zero investment is similar in form to 
the intertemporal tradeoff that holds for positive investment.  
 
4.  From theory to estimation 
4.1.  Specification issues 
  In order to estimate equation (19), we need to make several additional assumptions.  
First, the two variables dated t+1 are evaluated under the assumption of rational expectations:  
Et{Xt+1} = Xt+1 + υt, where Xt = {p
+
t+1, GI[It+1,Kt+1]} and υt is an expectation error.  Second, we 
assume that the irreversibility premium is constant over time.  Third, the technology shock (εt) 
affecting marginal productivity enters additively.  Fourth, the unobservable ωt becomes part of 
the error term. 
  As noted in the introduction, other influences besides irreversibility may affect the 
discount rate that firms use in evaluating investment projects.  We adjust the market discount 
rate (rt) for systematic risk, inflation, and taxes, as discussed in Section 4.2 and the Data 
Appendix.  Moreover, we capture the effects of factors common to all firms by including a  
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parameter, ψ, in the econometric equation.  With these modifications, the irreversibility premium 
is computed as the difference between the effective discount rates when firms are likely to face 
binding irreversibility constraints and the remaining observations.  Based on these assumptions, 




t + GI[It,Kt]) (1+rt+δt+ψ+θ Γt)  +  (πK,t + p
+
t+1 + GI[It+1,Kt+1])  =  ut,      (20a) 
 
 u t  ≡  ϖt − υt − εt,          (20b) 
      
where Γt is an indicator variable (1 if an observation falls into a class with a high probability of 
facing a binding irreversibility constraint, 0 otherwise), ϖt equals ωt (1+rt+δt+ψ+θ Γt), and ut is a 
composite error term.  We have added a time subscript to δ because we allow for time-varying 
depreciation rates, as described in the Data Appendix.   
  To complete the estimating equation, the marginal adjustment cost and marginal revenue 
product functions need to be specified.  We assume that the marginal adjustment cost function 
GI[It,Kt] depends on the investment/capital ratio. We use the following first-order Taylor 
approximation, 
 
  GI[It,Kt]  =  α(It/Kt) .            ( 2 1 )    
  
The marginal revenue product of capital depends on the underlying production and adjustment 
cost functions and product market characteristics.  The production function is assumed to be 
homogeneous of degree (1+ξ), where ξ is not necessarily equal to zero.  Product markets may be 
imperfectly competitive, and the demand schedule has a constant elasticity of μ > 0.  Using 
Euler's Theorem on Homogeneous Functions, we obtain the following specification for the 
marginal revenue product of capital, 
 
  πK,t  =  ζ*(SALESt/Kt) − (COSTt/Kt) + GI[It,Kt]*(It/Kt) ,       ( 2 2 )  
  
where (SALESt/Kt) and (COSTt/Kt) are sales revenues and variable costs, respectively, divided 
by the beginning-of-period capital stock, GI[It,Kt] is defined in equation (21), and ζ equals ζ ≡  
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(1+ξ) (1-μ), thus capturing the combined effects of non-constant returns to scale and imperfect 
competition.  Decreasing returns to scale and/or non-competitive product markets imply that  
ζ < 1.    
  The main econometric results are based on the Euler equation (20a) estimated by GMM 
with the following instruments:  11 1 (1 )( / ) tt t SALES K τ − −− − ,  11 1 (1 )( / ) tt t IK τ −− − − , 
1, 1 , 1 (1 )(1 ) tf t t r τ δ −− − −+ + ,  ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 (1 )( / )
IY
st st st st itc z p p −−−− −− , and an indicator variable (Γt) identifying 
a class of observations likely to face a binding irreversibility constraint, where τt is the marginal 
corporate income tax rate,    , f t r  is the real, risk-adjusted market discount rate for firm f,  , s t δ  is 
the depreciation rate for sector s, itcs,t is the investment tax credit rate, zs,t, is the present value of 
depreciation allowances per dollar of investment spending,  ,
I
s t p  is the price of capital goods, and 
,
Y
s t p  is the price of output.
7   
 
4.2. Panel Dataset  
   The panel data consists of 127,863 observations on 16,140 firms for the period 1980-
2001.
8  The primary data source is CompuStat with additional information obtained from CRSP 
and various sources of industry and aggregate data.  Details about the data are contained in the 
Data Appendix. 
  In studying non-convexities, a large panel dataset is essential in order to obtain a 
meaningful number of observations in the positive, negative, and zero investment regimes.  We 
maximize the size of the dataset used in estimation in three ways.  First, we use an unbalanced 
                                           
7 Andrews and Lu (2001) discuss the role of the J statistic in detecting correlation between the 
instruments and unobserved fixed effects in the error term (which, if present, could lead to inconsistent 
parameter estimates).  As shown below in Table 2 (and other tables), the J statistic for the non-convex 
adjustment cost model provides no evidence of such a correlation (and the model fits better without first 
differencing to remove fixed effects, perhaps because of the stronger link between instruments and Euler 
equation variables in levels), so we do not first difference the model.  Other studies, using slightly 
different specifications and data, find that first differencing can be useful in estimating Euler equations. 
 
8 The number of observations used in estimating the Euler equation is smaller because: 1) some of the 
required variables (including classification variables) are not available for specific observations; 2) some 
observations are lost because the required leads and lags are not available; 3) we trim the sample, as 
discussed below, to eliminate unreliable data (although this results in a smaller loss of observations than 
either 1) or 2)).  
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panel and thus avoid the severe data restrictions imposed by a balanced panel.  This choice has 
the further advantage of attenuating survivorship bias.  Second, even in an unbalanced panel, 
some methods of constructing the replacement value of the capital stock require long strings of 
contiguous data to implement the perpetual inventory formula.  We partly avoid this problem by 
tailoring our algorithm to preserve observations when there are gaps in the data and to use data 
that are more frequently available in CompuStat (e.g., when we find evidence of substantial 
acquisitions and divestitures, we use data on property, plant, and equipment in addition to the 
capital expenditure data).  An additional problem posed by the perpetual inventory formula is its 
dependence on an initial or seed value of the capital stock drawn from financial statements.  This 
initial value can be a particularly poor measure of the replacement cost of capital that distorts the 
computed capital stock until the impact of the initial value is largely depreciated.  One solution 
to this problem is to compute the capital stock for many years before using these data in 
estimation, but this approach discards a substantial number of observations.  As an alternative, 
we adopt the procedure discussed in detail in Chirinko and Schaller (2004b) that computes an 
adjustment factor for the initial value taken from the financial statements.  Third, the Euler 
equation and the instruments we have chosen require only three years of contiguous data. 
Our efforts to preserve observations make a substantial difference in the number of cases 
of zero and negative investment in the dataset.  For example, firms with less than 10 years of 
data account for approximately one-half of the zero investment observations.  More than two-
thirds of the zero investment observations are for firms with gaps in their data series.  
The market discount rate is constructed in several steps.  We begin with a weighted 
average of the nominal returns to debt and equity, where the weights vary by sector.  The 
nominal return to debt is adjusted for the tax deductibility of interest payments.  The nominal 
return to equity is based on the CAPM and thus accounts for systematic risk.  The nominal 
weighted average is converted to a real return with an inflation adjustment that varies across 
sectors and over time.    
  The other variables used in this study are constructed as follows.  Gross nominal 
investment is capital expenditures computed in a two-step procedure.  We begin with the data on 
capital expenditures (CompuStat item 128). CompuStat does not always have reliable data for 
the changes to the capital stock associated with large acquisitions or divestitures, and we modify 
the algorithm of Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1999) to adjust the initial investment data.  If the  
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financial statement data indicate a substantial acquisition or divestiture, we use accounting 
identities to derive a more accurate measure of investment that replaces the data from item 128.  
Net Sales is CompuStat item 12.  Variable costs is the sum of the Cost of Goods Sold 
(CompuStat item 41) and Selling, General, and Administrative Expense (CompuStat item 189; 
when this item is not reported, it is set to zero.)  The depreciation rate is taken from the BEA, 
and is allowed to vary across industries and over time.  The relative price of investment is the 
ratio of the price of investment to the price of output.  These industry-specific, implicit price 
deflators are taken from the BEA; the relative price series is adjusted for corporate income taxes.   
The firms in our dataset are a representative sample of U.S. publicly traded firms. In fact, 
the sample approaches the universe of U.S. publicly traded firms.  This makes our sample large 
compared to many previous investment studies.  In part, this is because we apply relatively few 
filters to the data, potentially leading to a more representative sample but also making it possible 
that some data will be noisy due to mergers, acquisitions, or other corporate events that lead to 
significant accounting changes.  To address this issue, we use 3% trimming of the upper and 
lower tails for SALES/K, COST/K, and I/K. 
There is enormous variety in size and capital requirements.  Table 1 presents summary 
statistics (before trimming).  For the full sample in column 1, the median ratio of investment to 
the capital stock is 0.078.  The median capital stock is about $57 million (1996 dollars).  As is 
typically the case with firm-level data, the mean capital stock is much larger, about $10 billion.  
Demand uncertainty is the unpredictable variation in the ratio of sales to the capital stock; the 
median of the variance of the sales/capital residual is 0.296.  Median cost uncertainty is 0.250.  
Details of the procedure for calculating demand and cost uncertainty are provided in Section 
6.1.3 below.  The median depreciation rate is about 8%.  
The next four column entries are for subsamples based on four characteristics that will be 
used in the econometric analysis to identify observations when a firm is likely to face 
irreversibility constraints. 
  Of particular interest in a study of non-convex costs of adjustment, about 4% of the 
observations have negative investment and about 1% have zero investment.  The amount of 
capital shed by the median firm when its investment is negative is of the same order of 
magnitude as the amount of capital added by the median firm when its investment is positive Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
Median, [mean], (standard deviation).  K is the capital stock, I/K is the investment/capital ratio, Demand Uncertainty is the variance of 
shocks to sales from a vector autoregression with the main variables relevant for investment -- sales, costs, the discount factor, the 
relative price of investment goods, and the investment/capital ratio, and Cost Uncertainty is the variance of shocks to costs from the 
same vector autoregression.  (Sales and costs are both normalized by the capital stock.)  See Section 4 for precise definitions of the 






























































































































































































Firms 16140 5646  6498  4577  4577  4523  16030  3470  719  3928 
Observations 127863  47447  53784  36678  36535  11494  121844  4622  1397  6019  
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(in both cases, measuring investment relative to the firm's capital stock).  Observations with 
negative investment tend to come from smaller firms and firms that face more demand and cost 




5. Tests of Competing Models 
  In Section 3, we derive the empirical specification for the non-convex adjustment cost 
model.  It is straightforward to derive the corresponding empirical specification for the convex 
adjustment cost model as a special case.  In this section, we derive this special case and then test 
the competing models.   
  The two features that lead to non-convexities are: 1) the difference between the purchase 
and resale price of capital; and 2) the presence of fixed costs.  If p
+  =  p
- and F  =  0, then  
  
C[I,K]  =  p
+I  +  G[I,K]                       (4’) 
 
qt  =  CI[It,Kt]  =  p
+
t + GI[It,Kt] .                    ( 5 ’ )  
 
Equations (7) and (8) are unchanged.  Equation (11) simplifies to 
  
Et{qt+1}  =  Et{ p
+
t+1 + GI[It+1,Kt+1] .                  ( 1 1 ’ )  
 
Equation (11’) implies that ηt = 0 in (13) and (15).  Since there is no difference between 
purchase and resale prices for capital, p
+
t+j  =  pt+j for j = 0,1,….  Thus θt  =  0.  The resulting 
Euler equation for the convex adjustment cost model is 
    
 −(pt + GI[It,Kt]) (1+rt+δt+ψ)  +  (πK,t + pt+1 + GI[It+1,Kt+1])  =  ut,            (20a’) 
   ut  ≡  − υt − εt,                       ( 2 0 b ’ )      
  
  If we estimate the convex adjustment cost model, but non-convex adjustment costs are 




 u t  =  ϖt − υt − εt + (p
+
t + GI[It,Kt])θ Γt.                      (20b’’) 
 
Thus, if non-convex adjustment costs are present in the data and we ignore them, an additional 
term that is not present in equation (20b) will appear in the error for the investment Euler 
equation, (p
+
t + GI[It,Kt])θ Γt.  Since this term includes many elements (the price of capital 
goods, marginal adjustment costs, the irreversibility premium, and the indicator variable for a 
class of firms with a high probability of facing a binding irreversibility constraint) that are not 
present in the Euler equation error in (20b) or (20b'), a standard test of overidentifying 
restrictions may have power to distinguish between the convex and non-convex adjustment cost 
models. 
  The first row of Table 2 reports the test of overidentifying restrictions for the convex 
adjustment cost model (estimated on the full sample).  The J statistic is 28.854, so the convex 
adjustment cost model is rejected with a p-value of 0.000.
9     
  A natural question is whether the rejection of the convex adjustment cost model is due to 
the presence of non-convex adjustment costs or some other specification issue.  To test this, we 
first estimate the convex adjustment cost model on a subsample of firms that are particularly 
unlikely to face binding irreversibility constraints -- firms in industries with thick resale markets, 
which have high depreciation rates, and which face low demand uncertainty.
10  For this 
subsample of firms, the J statistic is 1.616 (with a p-value of 0.204, as shown in the second row 
of Table 2), so the convex adjustment cost model fits the data for firms that are unlikely to face 
binding irreversibility constraints. 
                                           
9 We used a smaller set of instruments ( 11 1 (1 )( / ) tt t SALES K τ − −− − ,  11 1 (1 )( / ) tt t IK τ −− − − , 
1, 1 , 1 (1 )(1 ) tf t t r τ δ −− − −+ + ) to estimate the convex adjustment cost model so that the J statistic will have 
the same degrees of freedom for both the convex and non-convex adjustment cost models.  The results in 
the first two rows of Table 2 are the same if we include either or both of the two additional instruments 
that we use to estimate the non-convex adjustment cost model and adjust the degrees of freedom for the J 
statistic; i.e., the convex adjustment cost model is strongly rejected for the full sample, but the data fail to 
reject it for observations that are unlikely to face binding irreversibility constraints. 
 
10 We discuss characteristics that affect the likelihood of facing a binding irreversibility constraint in more 




Tests of Competing Models 
 
Model Sample  N  J 
Convex Adjustment 
Cost 












Full 60,287  0.024 
[0.876] 
 
The J statistic is the Hansen J statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions (with p-value in 
brackets).  N is the number of observations.  Observations for which irreversibility constraints 
are unlikely to bind are defined as those with thick resale markets, high depreciation rates, and 
low demand uncertainty.  In the non-convex adjustment cost model, Γt is set equal to 1 for 
observations with low depreciation rates, where Γt is an indicator variable identifying a class of 
observations likely to face a binding irreversibility constraint.  (Table 3 provides additional 
results for other choices of Γt.) 
 
 
  Although the details differ, the results in the first two rows of Table 2 are consistent with 
evidence in Whited (1998), who finds that the overidentifying restrictions of the convex 
adjustment cost model are less strongly rejected for observations that are less likely to face 
binding irreversibility constraints.   
  As a further test between the competing models, we estimate the non-convex adjustment 
cost model.  The third row of Table 2 reports that the J statistic for the non-convex adjustment 
cost model is 0.024 (with a p-value of 0.876) when estimated on the full sample. 
  The three tests reported in Table 2 provide evidence that the model with non-convex 
adjustment costs is more consistent with the data than the model with only convex adjustment 




6.  Estimates of the Irreversibility Premium 
6.1.  Characteristics that affect the irreversibility premium 
6.1.1.  Limited resale markets 
In order for the problem of irreversibility to arise, firms must face some difficulty in 
reselling previously acquired capital goods.  In some theoretical work, this constraint is modeled 
as a complete inability to sell capital goods (e.g., Bertola and Caballero, 1994; Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994).   More generally, irreversibility can be modeled as a gap between the purchase 
and resale prices of capital goods, as we have done in Section 2.
11  We introduce two innovative 
approaches to measuring limited resale markets.   
First, we collect data on new and used capital goods transactions by industry from the 
Annual Capital Expenditures survey of the U.S. Census Bureau and define the variable "used" as 
the ratio of the sum of expenditures on used capital equipment to the sum of total (new plus 
used) capital expenditures.  We define an industry as having limited resale markets by the thin 
markets criterion if "used" is below the median over all industries.  The first column of Table 3 
presents estimates of the irreversibility premium based on the thin markets definition of limited 
resale markets.  The estimated irreversibility premium is 110 basis points (with a standard error 
of 100 basis points). 
The second approach is based on Shleifer and Vishny (1992), who develop a model of 
the liquidation value of assets.  In their model, the best buyers of assets (from the perspective of 
the seller) are other firms in the same industry, since they compete to purchase the asset at a 
price at or near the “value in best use.”  Liquidation values will therefore tend to be reduced if 
the shocks that hit firms in the industry are highly synchronised.  We empirically estimate 
synchronicity using the average correlation between stock market returns for all firms in the 
industry.
12  An industry is classified as having high synchronicity if it is above the median  
                                           
11 Data on purchase and resale prices are seldom available.  Two notable exceptions are the studies by 
Ramey and Shapiro (2001, U.S. aerospace industry) and Asplund (2000, Swedish metalworking 
machinery). 
 
12 For example, suppose an industry has three firms A, B, and C. Then the synchronicity for this industry 
is simply (Corr(A,B) + Corr(A,C) + Corr(B,C))/3 where Corr(X,Y) denotes the correlation between the 





Estimates of the irreversibility premium 
   





































































N  59196 59908  60287  45844  45844  40840 
 
The parameter θ is the irreversibility premium.  The parameter ζ captures the combined effects 
of non-constant returns to scale and imperfect competition.  The parameter α governs the 
adjustment cost technology.  Standard errors are in parentheses under the parameter estimates.  
The J statistic is the Hansen J statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions (with p-values in 
brackets).  The statistic N is the number of firm/year observations.  Parameter estimates are 
based on equation (20) with the definitions in equations (21) and (22).  The estimation method is 
GMM with the following instruments: SALES/K, I/K, 1 r δ + + , /
IY p p  (all for the previous 
period and adjusted for taxes), and an indicator variable (Γt) identifying a class of observations 
likely to face a binding irreversibility constraint (listed at the top of the column). Section 4.2 and 
the Data Appendix contain definitions, sources, and details about the construction of the 
variables, and Section 6 contains precise definitions of the classes. 
 
 
industry by synchronicity.  The second column of the table presents estimates of the  
irreversibility premium based on the synchronicity definition of limited resale markets.  The 
estimated irreversibility premium is 510 basis points (with a standard error of 80 basis points).
13   
 
                                           
13 Since the synchronicity definition seems to better capture limited resale markets, we focus on this 
definition in subsequent tables.  
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6.1.2.  Low depreciation rates 
Suppose a firm finds itself with excess capital but the costs of selling capital (resale 
discount and fixed costs of negative investment) are too great to induce it to actively shed 
capital.  The only way of reducing its capital stock is through depreciation.  In industries with 
low depreciation rates, this recourse is sharply limited, suggesting that the irreversibility 
premium can be estimated by focusing on industries with low depreciation rates.  In the third 
column of  Table 3, we present estimates of the irreversibility premium for firms in industries 
with depreciation rates below the median depreciation rate over all industries.  The estimated 
irreversibility premium is 220 basis points (with a standard error of 80 basis points). 
 
6.1.3. Uncertainty 
In the absence of uncertainty, irreversibility would make no difference to investment 
behavior.  Previous theoretical work suggests that the irreversibility premium is increasing in the 
degree of uncertainty.  In this theoretical work, uncertainty is the variance of demand and/or cost 
shocks.  To construct a corresponding empirical measure of demand uncertainty, we estimate a 
vector autoregression with the main variables relevant for investment -- sales, costs, the discount 
factor, the relative price of investment goods, and the investment/capital ratio.  Sales and costs 
are both normalized by the capital stock.  (The investment/capital ratio is included because it is a 
useful forecasting variable under standard assumptions.  In models based on convex adjustment 
costs, I/K reflects the expected present value of future marginal products of capital; more 
generally, in models with non-convexities, investment will depend on the present value of future 
marginal products of capital over some range.)  Our measure of demand uncertainty is the firm-
specific variance of the sales residuals.  Firms with variances above the median over all firms are 
defined as having high demand uncertainty.  The fourth column of Table 3 shows that the 
estimated irreversibility premium is 730 basis points (with a standard error of 70 basis points).  
The definition of cost uncertainty is directly parallel to the definition of demand uncertainty.  
The fifth column of the table shows that the estimated irreversibility premium for firms with high 




6.1.4.  Negative industry-wide shocks 
In standard models of non-convexities, unfavorable shocks tend to push firms toward the 
irreversibility constraint (or, more generally, toward non-positive investment).  The 
irreversibility constraint is more likely to bind in response to industry-wide negative shocks than 
firm-specific shocks, since industry-wide shocks will increase both the probability of a firm 
being forced to undertake zero or negative investment and the cost of operating in either of these 
two regimes.  Think, for example, of the hundreds of commercial airplanes parked in the desert 
in the southwestern U.S. as a result of the negative shock to the airline industry in the wake of 
September 11.  We define an industry as subject to negative industry-wide shocks if the industry 
mean of sales residuals from the VAR (described above) over the previous two years is in the 
lowest 25% of industry means.  As shown in the sixth column of Table 3, the irreversibility 
premium is 550 basis points (with a standard error of 250 basis points) for firms subject to 
industry-wide negative shocks. 
 
 
6.2.  Combinations of two characteristics that affect the irreversibility premium 
6.2.1.  Limited resale markets 
Just because a firm faces limited resale markets does not mean it is very likely to 
encounter a binding irreversibility constraint.  If the firm has a high depreciation rate, it faces 
relatively little uncertainty, and its industry is doing well, the probability that the irreversibility 
constraint will bind is low.  If one of these conditions is not met, there is a greater chance that the 
firm will be stuck with excess capital.   
  In Table 4a, we examine the interaction between limited resale markets (as measured by 
high synchronicity) and other variables that might affect the irreversibility premium.  The first 
column shows that the interaction of limited resale markets and low depreciation increases the 
irreversibility premium by 280 basis points, relative to low depreciation alone.
14  The second 
column shows that the combination of high demand uncertainty and limited resale markets 
increases the irreversibility premium by 350 basis points, relative to high demand uncertainty 
                                           
14 To see this, subtract the irreversibility premium based on low depreciation alone (220 basis points, from 
the third column of Table 3) from the irreversibility premium based on the interaction of limited resale 
markets and low depreciation (500 basis points, from the first column of Table 4a).  
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alone.  The third column shows that the interaction of cost uncertainty and limited resale markets 
increases the irreversibility premium by 370 basis points.  As reported in the fourth column, the 
combination of negative industry-wide shocks and limited resale markets increases the 
irreversibility premium by 140 basis points.   
 
Table 4a 
Estimates of the Irreversibility Premium 
   












































N  59,908  45,567 45,567 40,587 
 
The parameter θ is the irreversibility premium.  The parameter ζ captures the combined effects 
of non-constant returns to scale and imperfect competition.  The parameter α governs the 
adjustment cost technology.  Standard errors are in parentheses under the parameter estimates.  
The J statistic is the Hansen J statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions (with p-values in 
brackets).  The statistic N is the number of firm/year observations.  Parameter estimates are 
based on equation (20) with the definitions in equations (21) and (22).  The estimation method is 
GMM with the following instruments: SALES/K, I/K, 1 r δ + + , /
IY p p  (all for the previous 
period and adjusted for taxes), and an indicator variable (Γt) identifying a class of observations 
likely to face a binding irreversibility constraint (listed at the top of the column).  Section 4.2 and 
the Data Appendix contain definitions, sources, and details about the construction of the 
variables, and Section 6 contains precise definitions of the classes.   
 
 
6.2.2.  Low depreciation rates 
  Table 4b uses combinations of a low depreciation rate and other variables to estimate the 
irreversibility premium.  The first column of Table 4b presents estimates of the irreversibility 
premium for firms with low depreciation rates and a high degree of demand uncertainty.  The 
estimated irreversibility premium is 230 basis points higher, relative to high demand uncertainty  
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alone.  The irreversibility premium is 960 basis points (with a standard error of 120 basis points).  
Results are similar for cost uncertainty, as shown in the second column.  The most striking result 
in Table 4 is the irreversibility premium for firms that have low depreciation rates and that have 
suffered recent negative industry-wide shocks.  For these firms, the estimated irreversibility  
 
Table 4b 
Estimates of the Irreversibility Premium 
   


































N  45,844 45,844 40,840 
 
The parameter θ is the irreversibility premium.  The parameter ζ captures the combined effects 
of non-constant returns to scale and imperfect competition.  The parameter α governs the 
adjustment cost technology.  Standard errors are in parentheses under the parameter estimates.  
The J statistic is the Hansen J statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions (with p-values in 
brackets).  The statistic N is the number of firm/year observations.  Parameter estimates are 
based on equation (20) with the definitions in equations (21) and (22).  The estimation method is 
GMM with the following instruments: SALES/K, I/K, 1 r δ + + , /
IY p p  (all for the previous 
period and adjusted for taxes), and an indicator variable (Γt) identifying a class of observations 
likely to face a binding irreversibility constraint (listed at the top of the column).  Section 4.2 and 
the Data Appendix contain definitions, sources, and details about the construction of the 
variables, and Section 6 contains precise definitions of the classes.   
 
 
premium is 1260 basis points (with a standard error of 380 basis points).  The estimates in this 
column reflect the situation of firms that are particularly likely to want to shed capital – and are 




6.2.3.  Uncertainty 
  Table 4c uses the combination of a high degree of uncertainty and negative industry-wide 
shocks to estimate the irreversibility premium.  In the wake of negative industry-wide shocks, 
firms with a high degree of demand uncertainty have an irreversibility premium 350 basis points 
higher than they do in the absence of these shocks.  A similar result (not reported) holds for 
firms with a high degree of cost uncertainty. 
 
Table 4c 
Estimates of the Irreversibility Premium 
   
  Negative Industry-wide Shock and  
 
  High Demand Uncertainty  High Cost 
Uncertainty  
















N 40840  40840 
 
The parameter θ is the irreversibility premium.  The parameter ζ captures the combined effects 
of non-constant returns to scale and imperfect competition.  The parameter α governs the 
adjustment cost technology.  Standard errors are in parentheses under the parameter estimates.  
The J statistic is the Hansen J statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions (with p-values in 
brackets).  The statistic N is the number of firm/year observations.  Parameter estimates are 
based on equation (20) with the definitions in equations (21) and (22).  The estimation method is 
GMM with the following instruments: SALES/K, I/K, 1 r δ + + , /
IY p p  (all for the previous 
period and adjusted for taxes), and an indicator variable (Γt) identifying a class of observations 
likely to face a binding irreversibility constraint (listed at the top of the column). Section 4.2 and 
the Data Appendix contain definitions, sources, and details about the construction of the 





6.3.  Multiple combinations of variables that affect the irreversibility premium 
  The firms that are the most likely to face a binding irreversibility constraint are those 
with limited resale markets, low depreciation, high uncertainty, and negative industry-wide 
shocks.  In Table 5, we examine multiple combinations of these characteristics.  Two broad 
conclusions emerge.   
 
Table 5 
Estimates of the Irreversibility Premium 
Combinations of three or more characteristics 
   










































































N 45,567  40,587  40,840  40,587  40,587 
 
The parameter θ is the irreversibility premium.  The parameter ζ captures the combined effects 
of non-constant returns to scale and imperfect competition.  The parameter α governs the 
adjustment cost technology.  Standard errors are in parentheses under the parameter estimates.  
The J statistic is the Hansen J statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions (with p-values in 
brackets).  The statistic N is the number of firm/year observations.  Parameter estimates are 
based on equation (20) with the definitions in equations (21) and (22).  The estimation method is 
GMM with the following instruments: SALES/K, I/K, 1 r δ + + , /
IY p p  (all for the previous 
period and adjusted for taxes), and an indicator variable (Γt) identifying a class of observations 
likely to face a binding irreversibility constraint (listed at the top of the column). Section 4.2 and 
the Data Appendix contain definitions, sources, and details about the construction of the 




  First, the irreversibility premium tends to be higher when several variables combine to 
increase the likelihood that a firm will face a binding irreversibility constraint.  For example, 
when there are limited resale markets and low depreciation rates, the estimated irreversibility 
premium is 500 basis points, as shown in the first column of Table 4a.  When limited resale 
markets and low depreciation are combined with high demand uncertainty, the irreversibility 
premium rises to 1360 basis points, as shown in the first column of Table 5. 
  Second, the magnitude of the irreversibility premium is substantial.  For example, when a 
firm with limited resale markets and a low depreciation rate is hit by a negative industry-wide 
shock, the irreversibility premium is 17.4%.  This is large in comparison with time series 
fluctuations in the risk-free real interest rate, which rarely varies by more than 10% over the 
course of a business cycle.
15  It is noteworthy that the estimated irreversibility premium is 
particularly high when it is measured using a combination of negative industry-wide shocks and 
characteristics such as limited resale markets and low depreciation rates that make it difficult to 
eliminate excess capital.  An implication of the estimates of the irreversibility premium from 
Table 5 is that monetary and other shocks can have a much larger effect on investment than is 
implied by standard estimates of the user cost elasticity, because the effective discount rate 
varies much more than the measured real interest rate.  The estimates of the irreversibility 
premium from Table 5 also imply that non-convex adjustment frictions play an economically 
important role in investment fluctuations.   
 
7.  Irreversibility and Finance Constraints 
  Non-convex adjustment costs are not the only friction that could affect the shadow 
discount rate.  There is a substantial literature on finance constraints and their implications for 
investment.
16  Whited (1992) is a pioneering paper that shows how investment Euler equations 
                                           
15 For example, one of the largest increases in the risk-free real interest rate took place during the Volcker 
disinflation, when the mean real interest rate rose from around -2% to 6%.  (See, e.g., Garcia and Perron 
(1996), who estimate the mean real interest rate in a regime-switching framework over the period 1961-
1986.) 
16Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) is a pioneering paper in the modern literature on finance 
constraints and investment.  Hubbard (1998) provides a survey.  Whited and Wu (2006) is a recent paper 
that contains many additional references to the literature.  See Section 2 for additional references to 
papers that use investment Euler equations to test for finance constraints.  
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can be used to test for finance constraints.  In this section, we examine whether non-convex 
adjustment costs, finance constraints, or both affect the shadow discount rate. 
  The theoretical literature on finance constraints is based on the idea that there may be 
important information asymmetries between firms and potential providers of external finance.
17  
This literature suggests that the firms that are the most likely to be finance constrained are firms 
with good investment opportunities that have difficulty credibly communicating private 
information about these investment opportunities.  Young firms are often cited as being 
particularly prone to information asymmetries and are therefore more likely to face finance 
constraints.  In estimating the effect of finance constraints, we therefore focus on young firms 
with good investment opportunities (as measured by Tobin's Q). 
  We estimate the external finance premium using a technique that is  similar to the 
technique used in estimating the irreversibility premium.  Specifically, we expand the discount 
rate in equations (17), (19), and (20a) from rt to rt +  t φ , where  t φ  is the external finance 
premium.  We then estimate  t φ  as  t φ Ψ , where  t Ψ  is an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 
for young firms with good investment opportunities.
18  We use the same instruments that we 
have used previously for the non-convex adjustment cost model, except that we add  t Ψ .   
  The first column of Table 6 reports that the external finance premium is estimated as 
1300 basis points (with a standard error of 210 basis points).  The second column of Table 6 
reports the irreversibility premium (based on observations with low depreciation rates).  We 
focus initially on low depreciation rates since we are unaware of any paper in the substantial 
literature on finance constraints that has ever suggested that low depreciation rates would 
increase the likelihood of finance constraints.  The third column of the table reports estimates 
from a specification that includes both θ and φ .  Neither the estimated irreversibility premium 
nor the estimated external finance premium is much affected by the inclusion of both θ and φ .  
The estimated irreversibility premium rises from 220 to 250 basis points.  The estimated external  
                                           
17 See, e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) on debt markets and Myers and Majluf (1984) on equity markets.  
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) are among the papers that 
discuss the macroeconomic implications of asymmetric information in external finance markets. 
18 A firm is classified as having good investment opportunities for a given year if beginning-of-period 
Tobin's Q is above the median for all firms in that year.  A firm is classified as young if it has been in the 




Irreversibility and Finance Constraints 
 





















N  49,796 60,287 49,796 
 
The row labeled θ reports estimates of the irreversibility premium.  The row labeled φ  reports 
estimates of the external finance premium.  In the column "Model with Finance Constraints," the 
external finance premium is captured by allowing young firms with good investment 
opportunities (characteristics associated with a higher likelihood of finance constraints in 
theoretical models) to have a different intertemporal discount rate than other firms.  Similarly, in 
the column "Model with Irreversibility," firms with low depreciation rates are allowed to have a 
different intertemporal discount rate.  The column "Model with Irreversibility and Finance 
Constraints" allows for both an irreversibility premium and an external finance premium, with 
each identified in the same way as in the two previous columns.  The J statistic is the Hansen J 
statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions (with p-values in brackets).  The statistic N is the 
number of firm/year observations.  In each column, all observations with the necessary data are 
included in the sample.  Standard errors are in parentheses under the parameter estimates.  
Except for inclusion of the external finance premium in the specification (and the corresponding 
instrument), estimation and instruments are similar to those for Tables 3-5; for additional details, 
see Section 7. 
 
 
not the specification allows for an external finance premium.  In the case of negative industry-
wide shocks, the estimated irreversibility premium is approximately 500 basis points whether or 
finance premium rises from 1300 to 1320 basis points.  The standard errors of both the 
irreversibility premium and the external finance premium are unaffected. 
  Table 7 examines two further variables that are likely to be associated with irreversibility 
-- high demand uncertainty and negative industry-wide shocks.  If these variables were simply 
proxies for finance constraints, the inclusion of an explicit measure of finance constraints could 
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Alternative Measures of Irreversibility 
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N  45,844 41,527 40,840 37,125 
 
The row labeled θ reports estimates of the irreversibility premium.  The row labeled φ  reports 
estimates of the external finance premium.  Standard errors are in parentheses under the 
parameter estimates.  The table reports results for two measures of the likelihood of facing a 
binding irreversibility constraint.  Under the heading "High Demand Uncertainty," Γt=1 for 
observations with high demand uncertainty.  Under the heading "Negative Industry-Wide 
Shock," Γt=1 for observations with negative industry-wide shocks.  In the columns "Model with 
Irreversibility and Finance Constraints," the external finance premium is captured by allowing 
young firms with good investment opportunities (characteristics associated with a higher 
likelihood of finance constraints in theoretical models) to have a different intertemporal discount 
rate than other firms.  The J statistic is the Hansen J statistic for testing overidentifying 
restrictions (with p-values in brackets).  The statistic N is the number of firm/year observations.  
In each column, all observations with the necessary data are included in the sample.  Except for 
inclusion of the external finance premium in the specification (and the corresponding 
instrument), estimation and instruments are similar to those for Tables 3-5; for additional details, 
see Section 7. 
 
 
irreversibility premium.  In the data, this does not occur.  In the case of high demand uncertainty, 
the estimated irreversibility premium is approximately 700 basis points, regardless of whether or  
not the specification allows for an external finance premium.  In both cases, the external finance 
premium remains substantial (about 900 basis points in the first case and about 1300 basis points 




  The empirical results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that both non-convex adjustment costs 
and financial frictions have substantial effects on the effective discount rate.   
 
8. Investment Regimes 
  In Abel and Eberly (1994), there are three investment regimes – positive investment, zero 
investment, and negative investment.  The non-convex adjustment cost model described in 
Section 3, which is based on the Abel and Eberly model, also involves three investment regimes.  
In this section, we examine whether the model provides a good fit to the data for each of these 
investment regimes.   
  For non-positive investment, the model implies that equation (17) is replaced by equation 
(19).  Since ωt is not directly observable, it appears in the error term along with the technology 
shock (εt) and the expectational error (υt), as shown in equation (20).  For the sample as a whole, 
the presence of ωt in the error term does not lead to a rejection of the non-convex adjustment 
cost model, as illustrated in the first column of Table 8 (for five different characteristics that 
affect the irreversibility premium).  The J test fails to reject the Euler equation. 
  The second column examines the observations with positive investment.  For these 
observations, ωt does not enter the error term, and the J test again fails to reject the Euler 
equation at the 5% level of significance.  Interestingly, there is no systematic difference in the 
level of the J statistics, compared to the first column.  In some cases, the J statistic rises; in 
others, it falls.   
  The third and fourth columns provide the sharpest test, focusing only on non-positive 
investment observations for which ωt is present in the error term. Again, the J statistic is higher 
in some cases (compared to the first column), while in other cases it is lower.  There are no cases 
where the model is rejected when investment is zero or negative.  The failure to reject the non-
convex adjustment cost model does not seem to arise from a lack of power, since the convex 
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The J statistic is the Hansen J statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions (with p-value in 
brackets). The statistic N is the number of firm/year observations.  In all cases, all observations 
with the necessary data are included in the sample.  The rows reflect different choices of Γt, with 
Γt set equal to 1 for observations with the characteristic shown in the row heading, where Γt is an 




9.  Summary and conclusions    
  Irreversibility – or, more generally, non-convex adjustment costs – has important 
economic implications.  Firm dynamics become more complicated.  With irreversible capital, 
investment behavior becomes path dependent (Dixit, 1992), and aggregate investment depends 
on the higher moments of firm characteristics (Caballero, 1999).  Many tax distortions are 
amplified by irreversibilties (Faig and Shum, 1999; Panteghini, 2001).  Irreversible investment 
decisions change the nature of the inefficiencies arising from asymmetric information in capital 
markets (Lensink, Bo, and Sterken, 2001).  Insofar as monetary policy affects uncertainty, 
irreversible capital can create an additional channel through which monetary policy and 
inflationary shocks impact the real economy (Pindyck and Soliamanos, 1993).    
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  The irreversibility premium addresses the high hurdle rates puzzle posed by Dixit (1992).  
A variety of surveys suggest that managers use a discount rate that is substantially higher than 
the market discount rate.  For example, Poterba and Summers (1995) report that hurdle rates are 
"distinctly higher than equity holders' average rates of return and much higher than the return on 
debt during the past half-century" (p. 43).  Their average real hurdle rate of 12.2% substantially 
exceeds the real weighted-average market discount rate of 6.6%.
19  Thus, the high hurdle rate 
puzzle is approximately 560 basis points.  While several explanations have been offered to 
explain relatively high hurdle rates, the higher discount rates due to irreversibility may be a 
contributing factor, as suggested by Dixit (1992). 
  A variety of empirical studies have examined whether irreversibility exists.  In this paper, 
we make a distinctive contribution to this evidence by estimating the irreversibility premium, a 
readily interpretable measure of the economic importance of non-convex adjustment costs.  The 
evidence presented here suggests that the irreversibility premium is both economically and 
statistically significant.  
 
                                           
 19 The latter figure is a long-run weighted-average of debt and equity returns (adjusted for inflation) for the 
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This Data Appendix presents details about the construction of the capital stock and 
investment flow series, the tax-adjusted relative price of investment goods, and the real risk-
adjusted market discount rate. 
 
A. Capital Stock and Investment Flows 
For the first observation for firm f, the capital stock is based on the net plant (NPLANT), 
the nominal book value of net property, plant, and equipment (CompuStat item 8).  To convert 
this to real terms, we divide by the sector-specific price index for investment (p
I).  Since book 
value is not adjusted for changes in the value of capital goods purchased in the past, we adjust 

















=          ( A - 1 )  
 
where s is a sector index (for firm f’s sector) and  0
f t is the year of the first observation for firm f. 
  Failure to adjust book value affects the initial value of the capital stock, but has a 
geometrically decreasing impact on the measured capital stock over time.  After 15 years, the 
initial value effect is negligible.  We use this fact to construct the adjustment factor for the initial 
value of the capital stock.  For sector s, AF is the ratio of the mean unadjusted capital stock for 
firms of age 15 or greater to the mean of what the unadjusted capital stock would have been 
measured as, if t equaled 0
f t (i.e., if the current year were the firm's first year in the sample).  In 
effect, AF is the ratio of the true capital stock to the unadjusted initial value.  Additional details 
are available in Chirinko and Schaller (2004b). 
  For subsequent observations, a standard perpetual inventory method is used to construct 




















where δ is the depreciation rate, KCHG is gross additions to the firm’s capital stock and, in this 
Data Appendix, the capital stock is dated at the end of the period.  The firm reports the additions 
in nominal terms, so we divide by p
I to convert to real terms. 
  In the standard case, KCHG is gross investment (GI), which is capital expenditures in the 
firm’s financial statements (CompuStat item 128).  CompuStat does not always have reliable 
data for the additions to the capital stock associated with large acquisitions.  We use a modified 
version of the algorithm of Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1999) to adjust KCHG for acquisitions 
and divestitures.  In the case of a substantial acquisition, we can use accounting identities to 
derive a more accurate measure of the additions to the capital stock, 
 
,, , , f tf t f t f t DGPLANT GI ACQUIS RETIRE =+ −        (A-3) 
 
where DGPLANTt is the change in GPLANT from the end of year t-1 to the end of year t and 
GPLANTt is gross property, plant, and equipment (CompuStat item 7), ACQUIS is acquisitions, 
and RETIRE is retirements of capital stock (CompuStat item 184).  (When data on RETIRE is 
missing, we assume that the reason is that firms do not report any retirements in their financial 
statements, and we therefore assign a value of 0 to RETIRE for these observations.)  We use the 
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then we calculate the gross change in the capital stock as 
 
tt t KCHG DGPLANT RETIRE =+          ( A - 5 )  
 














we calculate the change in the capital stock as 
 
,, , 1 ,
I
f tf t f t s t KCHG DNPLANT K p δ − =+           ( A - 7 )  
 
where DNPLANT is the change in NPLANT (as defined above).
20  Because NPLANT in the 
firm's financial statements will deduct depreciation (as well as accounting for the divestiture), 
depreciation must be added to KCHG to avoid deducting depreciation twice. 
If  ,1 f t GPLANT − is missing (or equal to zero) or  , f t DGPLANT  is missing, it is not feasible 
to use these screens, and we set KCHG equal to GI. 
In some cases, there is a data gap for a particular firm.  In this case, we treat the first new 
observation for that firm in the same way as we would if it were the initial observation.  This 
avoids any potential sample selection bias that would result from dropping firms with gaps in 
their data. 
Investment (I) is defined by KCHG.   













δ =           ( A - 8 )  
 
where D$ is current-cost depreciation of private fixed assets by sector (BEA, Table 3.4ES), 
DQUANT is the chain-type quantity index of depreciation of private fixed assets by sector 
(BEA, Table 3.5ES), K$ is the current cost net stock of private fixed assets by sector (as defined 
                                           
20 To see this result, start with the perpetual inventory equation. 
1 (1 ) tt t K IK δ − =+−  
11 tt t t K KK I δ −− −+ =  
Now, put the previous equation in nominal terms. 
11 []
I II
ttt t tt t K Kp K pI p δ −− −+ =  
1
II
tt t t t t D N P L A N T K pI pK C H G δ − += =  
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above), and KQUANT is the chain-type quantity index of the net stock of private fixed assets by 
sector (BEA, Table 3.2ES). 
  We construct the sector-specific price index for new investment goods using BEA data:  
 
,, 1 9 9 6
,
,






=           ( A - 9 )  
 
where I$ is historical-cost investment in private fixed assets by sector (BEA, Table 3.7ES) and 
IQUANT is the chain-type quantity index of investment in private fixed assets by sector (BEA, 
Table 3.8ES). 
 
B.  The Tax-adjusted relative price of investment goods 
  The relative price of investment, rp, is adjusted for corporate income taxes and defined as 
follows, 
 
  rp  =  (p
I / p
Y)  (1  –  itc  –  z),          (B-1)   
 
where p
I is the sector-specific price deflator for new investment goods defined above, p
Y is the 
sector-specific price index for output defined as the implicit price deflator for Gross Domestic 
Product by industry produced by the BEA (normalized to 1 in 1996), itc is the investment tax 
credit rate, and z is the present value of depreciation allowances.   
Where variables are available at a monthly or quarterly frequency, we take the average 
for the calendar year.  The investment tax credit rates are drawn from Pechman (1987, p.160-
161).  Because the investment tax credit applies only to equipment, the investment tax credit for 
structures is zero; we multiply the statutory ITC rate for each year by the ratio of equipment 
investment to the sum of structures and equipment investment for that year.  The present value of 
depreciation allowances – for non-residential equipment and structures, respectively – were 
provided by Dale Jorgenson.  To calculate z, we took the weighted sum of Jorgenson's z’s for 
equipment and structures, where the weights are the share of equipment investment and the share 
of structures investment (for a given year) in nominal gross private non-residential investment in  
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fixed assets from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (Table 1IHI, where equipment investment is 
referred to as equipment and software).  
 
C.  The Real Risk-Adjusted Market Discount Rate 
  The real, risk-adjusted market discount rate is defined as follows,  
 
   , f t r   =  ((1+ ,
NOM
f t r ) / (1+
e
t π ))  -  1.0.         (C-1) 
 
The equity risk premium is calculated using CAPM.  The components of rf,t are  




f t r     =  Nominal, short-term, risk-adjusted cost of capital 
  =   λs (1-τt) 
, NOM DEBT




st r . 
 
, NOM DEBT
t r   =  Nominal corporate bond rate (Moody’s Seasoned Baa  





st r   =  Nominal, short-term, risk-adjusted cost of equity capital for  
   firms  in  sector  s. 
  =      
, NOM F
t r   +  σs. 
 
, NOM F




s t π     =  Sector-specific capital goods price inflation rate from t to t+1.  Sector-
specific data was not yet available for 2002 at the time of data 
construction, so the inflation rate for nonresidential fixed investment was 
used for  ,
e
s t π  for 2001. 
 
σs    =  Equity risk premium. 
 
τt    =  Marginal rate of corporate income taxation. 
 
λs    =  Sector-specific leverage ratio calculated as the mean of book debt for the 
sector divided by the mean of (book debt + book equity) for the sector. 
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Under the CAPM,  
 
σs  =  βs (μ
EQUITY- μ




βs   =  CAPM  β for sector s. 
 
μ
EQUITY  =  Total return on equities from 1950-2001.  The source is the value-
weighted CRSP index (including dividends).  
 
μ
F    =  Total return on risk-free Treasury bills from 1950-2001.  The source is the 
FRED database, specifically the series for 1-Year Treasury Constant 
Maturity Rate.   
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